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TAX NOTES
Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner:
Definitional Requirements of the Multiple
Corporation for Purposes of Exclusion from
Surtax Exemptions
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
recently has upheld the Treasury Regulations' expansive defini-
tion of a brother-sister controlled group. The author views this
decision in light of the history and purpose of the sections of the
Code and regulations which it construes. He concludes that the
court of appeals' construction is much broader than that in-
tended by Congress, and that legislative clarification is
necessary.
William Herbert owned one hundred percent of the stock of
Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. [FAP] and fifty-five percent of the stock
of Fairfax Auto Parts of North Virginia [NOVA]. Joseph Ofano
owned the remaining forty-five percent of the stock of NOVA and
had no interest in FAP. In computing their respective tax liabilities
for 1971 and 1972 the corporations each utilized a full surtax exemp-
tion pursuant to section 11(d) of the Internal Revenue Code., The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the corpora-
tions were component members of a brother-sister controlled group
as defined by section 1563(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code2 and
section 1.1563-1(a)(3) of the Treasury Regulations.3 Therefore those
corporations were required to share a single surtax exemption pur-
suant to section 1561(a)(1).4 The Commissioner assessed deficien-
cies accordingly.5 With four judges dissenting, the tax court decided
that since Joseph Ofano did not own stock in each corporation his
stock ownership could not be considered in determining whether or
not a controlled group existed.' In so holding the tax court declared
the section of the Treasury Regulations relied on by the Commis-
sioner invalid. Without considering Joseph Ofano's stock the eighty
percent ownership test of section 1563(a)(2) was not met, a brother-
1. See text accompanying notes 7-11 infra.
2. See text accompanying note 26 infra.
3. See note 42 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 21-24 infra.
5. See note 10 infra.
6. Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798 (1976).
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sister controlled group was found not to exist, and each corporation
was permitted a full surtax exemption. On appeal the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, reversed: In determin-
ing whether the eighty percent ownership test of section 1563(a)(2)
is met, the stock ownership of a "person" may be considered
whether or not such person owns some stock in each corporation and
section 1.1563-1 of the Treasury Regulations is valid. Fairfax Auto
Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 300 (1977).
The Fairfax decision is significant because it upholds the ex-
pansive definition of a brother-sister controlled group given by the
regulations. To appreciate the import of this decision, it is necessary
to view the decision in light of the history and purpose of the sec-
tions of the Code and regulations which it construes. The decision
also is notable because the consequences of meeting the definition
of brother-sister controlled group frequently transcend mere surtax
exemption considerations.
The taxation of corporate income consists of both a "normal
tax" and a "surtax." 7 At the time of the instant case the normal tax
was equal to twenty-two percent of taxable income' and the surtax
was equal to twenty-six percent of taxable income The first $25,000
of taxable corporate income, however, was exempt from the surtax
unless the corporation was found to be a member of a group of
multiple corporations to which section 1561 applies.'"
The surtax exemption of section 11(d) is designed to provide a
tax break for incorporators of small businesses." The exemption,
however, was subject to the possibility of abuse through the use of
the multi-corporate structure.'" Prior to the enactment of section
7. I.R.C. § 11(a).
8. Tax Reform Act of 1969, ch. 1, § 11(b), 78 Stat. 25 (current version at I.R.C. § 11(b)).
9. I.R.C. § 11(c)(3).
10. Tax Reform Act of 1969, ch. 1, § 11(d), 78 Stat. 25 (current version at I.R.C. § 11(d)).
A full surtax exemption, therefore, was worth $6,500 (26% x $25,000). Since the Commissioner
determined that the corporations should have shared a single surtax exemption for each of
the two years in question, each corporation taking a $3,250 exemption in each year, he
assessed a deficiency of $6,500 per corporation.
11. The corporate surtax exemption, as embodied in the present tax structure, was first
enacted in 1950. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 121(a), 64 Stat. 914. For the legislative history
of the Act, see H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 97 (1969); H.R. REP. No.
749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 116-17 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1425.
12. The term "multiple corporation" means more than one corporation owned by sub-
stantially the same interests. The idea of multiple corporations is embodied in the section
1563 definitions of controlled groups of corporations. The concern was that a single large
enterprise would break up into many corporations to have a larger portion of its income taxed
at the surtax exempt rate. For example, one corporation earning $1,000,000 annually would
be taxed $473,500 (22% x $25,000 plus 48% x $975,000) whereas 40 corporations annually
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1561 the Commissioner had various ways to attack such abuses.
Through the use of sections 269,1 1551,1 482,'1 61, and the common
law theories of "assignment of income," "disregard of corporate
entity" and "sham transaction,"' 6 the Commissioner was able to
minimize the procurement of additional surtax exemptions through
the use of multiple corporations. 7 The efficacy of these devices was
limited, however, because a demonstration by the Commissioner of
earning $25,000 each would be taxed only $220,000 (22% x $25,000 x 40). For instances where
taxpayers attempted to use "multiple corporations" to evade taxes in such a manner, see
James Realty Co. v. United States, 280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960); Shaw Constr. Co., 35 T.C.
1102 (1961); Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582 (1959).
13. Section 269 provides generally that if an individual or corporation acquires control
of a corporation and "the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion
or avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit or other
allowance which such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy, then the Secretary
may disallow such deduction, credit, or other allowance." "Control" for the purpose of this
section is 50% stock ownership.
14. Section 1551 discourages the transfer of property by a corporation or control group
of individuals to a transferee corporation which was created for the purpose of acquiring such
property or was not actively engaged in business at the time of such acquisition. If, after the
transfer, the transferors are in control of the transferee corporation during any part of the
taxable year of such transferee corporation, the Secretary may disallow the surtax exemption
for such taxable year. If the transferee corporation can establish by the clear preponderance
of the evidence that the securing of such exemption or credit was not a major purpose of the
transfer, the Secretary may not disallow the exemption. I.R.C. § 1551(a).
15. Section 482 provides that in the case of two or more businesses owned or controlled
by the same interests the Commissoner "may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions, credits, or allowances between. . . such. . . businesses if. . .necessary in order
to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such . . . businesses."
16. These theories, often blended in their application, are based on the assumption that
tax law looks at substance over form and taxes the true earners of income. When corporations
are formed solely to evade taxes and are devoid of any real business functions the Commis-
sioner has argued successfully that a single corporation is the true earner of all of the income
and has taxed it accordingly. Hence functionless corporations are treated as "shams." They
are disregarded as corporate entities. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Shaw Constr.
Co., 35 T.C. 1102 (1961); Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582 (1959); cf. Knetsch v. United States,
364 U.S. 361 (1960) (taxpayer purchased insurance on which the cash value was borrowed
almost immediately, the interest being used to decrease income tax indebtedness); Higgins
v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940) (taxpayer deducted loss arising from sale of securities to a
corporation wholly owned by the taxpayer).
17. For an explanation of section 269, see B. BrrrER & J. Eus'ncE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, § 15.02, at 15-10, 16-21 (3d ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as BrrrKER]. For an explanation of section 1551, see BrrrKER § 15.02. For
an explanation of section 482, see BrrrK § 1506.
For a detailed analysis of the use of these sections and the theories of the Commissioner,
including the relevant case law, see Carruthers, The Treasury's Attack Upon the Tax Benefits
of the Multi-Corporate Complex, 28 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 555 (1970); Golden, Multiple
Incorporation and Multiple Surtax Exemptions, 26 GA. B.J. 385 (1963-64); Kessler, Multiple
Corporations Under the Revenue Act of 1964, 3 ILL. C.L.E. 93 (1965); Maier, Use of Multiple
Corporations Under the 1964 Revenue Act, 42 TAXES 565, 569-80 (1964); Multiple Corpora-
tions Under the Revenue Act of 1964, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1338 (1964-65); 44 MINN. L. Rav. 485
(1959-60); 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 145.
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a "tax avoidance purpose" was usually a prerequisite to their appli-
cation."s
The Revenue Act of 1964, through sections 156111 and 1563, 20
provided for the first time a mechanical limitation upon the abilities
of "multiple corporations" to enjoy the benefits of multiple surtax
exemptions.2' Under these sections if the percentage ownership tests
of either a parent-subsidiary controlled group 22 or a brother-sister
controlled group are met, the entire group of corporations is required
to share a single surtax exemption without further inquiry into
whether the structure was motivated by tax avoidance or legitimate
business purposes. 3 For purposes of the 1964 Act a brother-sister
18. See notes 13, 14, and 16, supra. Such a requirement often results in the allowance of
multiple surtax exemptions where a "business purpose" can be demonstrated to justify the
multicorporate structure. The most common business purposes for multiple incorporation are
differences in location, differences in business activities, and limited liability. For a discus-
sion of the possible benefits of multiple incorporation outside of tax considerations, i.e.
business purposes, see Worthy, Multiple Corporations, 1965 TUL. TAX INST. 136, 136-42. For
a discussion of the business purposes advanced in the cases and the success of taxpayers in
urging particular business purposes, see Cuddihy, Obtaining Multiple Deduction and Credits
for Multiple Corporations, 1961 TUL. TAX INST. 564; Ekman, How Many Corporations Can
Conduct a Business?, 19 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX 391 (1961); Emmanuel & Lipoff,
Commissioner v. Corporate Complex: An Expanding Attack, 15 U. FLA. L. REY. 352 (1962-
63); Paley, Multiple Corporations Face Ever-Increasing Attack; Realty Development
Vulnerable, 18 J. TAX. 130 (1963).
Section 1551 is limited further by being applicable only in the case of transfers. See note
14 supra. Section 482 has been used primarily to combat less than "arms length" transfers
between commonly owned interests. See Tress. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1954).
19. Revenue Act of 1964, ch. 6, § 1561(a), 78 Stat. 116.
20. Revenue Act of 1964, ch. 6, § 1563(a)(2), 78 Stat. 120.
21. Section 1561 provided inter alia that the component members of a controlled group
of corporations shall be limited to one surtax exemption under section 11(d), to be divided
equally or apportioned if all members consent. Section 1563 defined controlled group of
corporations as either a parent-subsidiary controlled group, see note 22 infra, or a brother-
sister controlled group, see text accompanying note 26 infra. A third and fourth category,
"combined groups" and "certain insurance companies," also are mentioned in section 1563.
The 1964 Act also provided for a broadening of section 1551. It was made to apply to indirect
as well as direct transfers of property and it was also expanded to apply to transfers from
controlled groups of individuals as well as corporations in control.
The effects of section 1561, however, were mitigated by section 1562, which provided that
a controlled group could elect to escape section 1561 and each corporate member benefit from
a full surtax exemption if they paid an additional six percent on the normal tax up to
$25,000.00.
22. A parent-subsidiary controlled group is defined as one or more chains of corporations
connected with a common parent corporation through 80% or more stock ownership of each.
I.R.C. § 1563(a)(1).
23. While Congress primarily feared that existing medium and large corporations would
split up into multiple corporations in order to take advantage of the surtax exemption, it
added that even multiple corporations formed to cope with business problems would be
penalized. Congress stated that the rule would be applied "where corporations owned and
controlled by the same interests engage in different businesses in the same area or conduct
the same type business in different geographical locales." H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st
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controlled group was defined as two or more corporations where one
individual owns eighty percent or more of the stock of each. 4
After finding that the eighty percent ownership test by one
individual was circumvented easily, 5 Congress, in writing the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, broadened the definition of a brother-sister
controlled group to:
Two or more corporations if 5 or fewer persons who are individu-
als, estates, or trusts own (within the meaning of subsection
(d)(2)) stock possessing-
(A) at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the total
value of shares of all classes of the stock of each corporation, and
(B) more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote or more than 50 percent of the
total value of all shares of all classes of stock of each corporation,
taking into account the stock ownership of each such person only
to the extent such stock ownership is identical with respect to
each such corporation."
While it is clear from the statutory language that for purposes
of the fifty percent test a person's stock cannot be considered unless
he owns stock in each corporation,27 it is ambiguous whether for
purposes of the eighty percent test, a person must own stock in each
corporation in order to have his ownership considered.28
An examination of the relevant legislative history of section
1563 suggests that a person must own stock in each corporation in
order to have his stock ownership considered for purposes of the
Sess. 118 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1426-27; S. REP. No. 830,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (1964), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1823-24.
Congress was quick to assure that "[o]f course, nothing in this bill is intended as changing
the application of sections 269, 1551, or 482 if the multiple corporation form of organization
is adopted to avoid taxes." Id.
24. Tax Reform Act of 1964, ch. 6, § 1563(a)(2), 78 Stat. 120.
25. See Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, at 5394 (1969).
26. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2). The Tax Reform Act of 1969 not only broadened the definition
of a brother-sister controlled group but made it more significant by repealing section 1562.
Thus, section 1561 could no longer be avoided by mere election. See discussion of section 1562
at note 21 supra.
27. The 50% test says "taking into account the stock ownership of each such person only
to the extent such stock ownership is identical with respect to each corporation." If A owned
40% of the stock of corporation X and 20% of the stock of corporation Y, his identical
ownership would be only 20%. If A owned 40% of X and 0% of Y, he would have 0% identical
ownership and would therefore be excluded from the 50% test.
28. One article has suggested that the language of the 80% test is so ambiguous as to
lead to four possible interpretations. Libin & Abramowitz, Multiple corporations: A surpris-
ing interpretation of Sec. 1563(a)(2) in temporary regulations, 2 TAx ADVISOR 326 (1971).
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eighty percent test.29 When the mechanical multiple corporation
tests were first proposed in 1963, a definition for brother-sister con-
trolled group was considered which would have required five or
fewer persons to own at least eighty percent of the stock in the
corporation not taking account of an individual's ownership to the
extent it exceeds twice the percentage ownership in another corpora-
tion." Thus each individual would have been required to own some
stock in each corporation.' When the legislation was reported by the
House, the stock ownership requirement had been reduced from five
or fewer persons to one person owning eighty percent of each corpo-
ration." No explanation for this change appears in the legislative
history.
In 1969 the House and Senate Reports mentioned the change
in definition of a brother-sister controlled group but failed to explain
the reasons for the change or to clearly exemplify the operation of
the new definitions.33 It is mentioned in the House Reports, however,
that the definition is intended to be the same as applies to section
1551(b)(2).11
Section 1551 provides in relevant part that:
If. . . five or fewer individuals who are in control of a corporation
transfer . . property ...to a transferee corporation, and the
transferee corporation was created for the purpose of acquiring
such property or was not actively engaged in business at the time
of such acquisition, and if after such transfer the transferor or
transferors are in control of such transferee corporation during
any part of the taxable year of such transferee corporation, then
for such taxable year of such transferee corporation the Secretary
may . . . disallow the surtax exemption. . . 35
Section 1551 defines control as:
[T]he ownership by the five or fewer individuals described in
such subsection of stock possessing-
(A) at least eighty percent of the total combined voting power of
29. Hearings on the President's 1963 Tax Message Before the House Committee on Ways
and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 4, pt. 1, at 77 (1963).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Seas. 119 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1612.
33. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., lt Sess., pt. 2, at 76 (1969), reprinted in [1969] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1748; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1969), reprinted in
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2167.
34. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., lot Sess., pt. 2, at 76 (1969), reprinted in [1969] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1956.
35. I.R.C. § 1551(a)(3) (emphasis added).
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all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least eighty percent of
the total value of shares of all classes of the stock of each corpora-
tion, and
(B) more than fifty percent of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock entitled to vote or more than fifty percent
of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of each corpora-
tion, taking into account the stock ownership of each such indi-
vidual only to the extent such stock ownership is identical with
respect to each such corporation."
The language underscored in the section seems fairly suggestive
that Congress intended all members of the controlled group to own
stock in the transferee and transferor. It is the transferors that must
be in control of the transferee-not "any" of the transferors or
"some" of them. Control is defined as ownership by "the five or
fewer individuals" of stock possessing certain percentages of owner-
ship of each corporation.
In addition, the legislative history of section 1551 makes it clear
that each member of the control group has to own some stock in
both the transferee and transferor corporations. The House Report
states that "section 1551 is extended to include the . . . transfer of
property . . . to a transferee corporation . . . by five or fewer indi-
viduals who are in control of a corporation, if after such transfer
such individuals are in control of the transferee corporation. ....
The report goes on to state that
Paragraph (2) of section 1551(b) provides that five or fewer indi-
viduals are in control if such individuals own...
(A) at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the
total value of shares of all classes of the stock of each corporation,
and
(B) more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power
of all classes of stock entitled to vote or more than 50 percent of
the total value of shares of all classes of stock of each corporation,
taking into account the stock ownership of each such individual
only to the extent such stock ownership is identical with respect
to each such corporation."
The following example offered in the report is also illustrative:
Example-On January 1, 1964, A owns 65 percent of the only
class of stock of corporation X and individual B owns the remain-
36. I.R.C. § 1551(b)(2) (emphasis added).
37. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. A210 (1963) (emphasis added), reprinted
in [19641 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1637.
38. Id. at A212.
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ing 35 percent of the stock. Also, on January 1, 1964, A and B
transfer property (other than money) to corporation Y (a newly
formed corporation) and receive stock of corporation Y in return.
After the transfer, A and B own the stock of corporation X and
Y in the following proportions:
Identical
Corporation X Corporation Y Ownership
A 65 35 35
B 35 65 35
TOTAL 100 100 70
The transfer of property by individuals A and B to corporation Y
is a transfer described in section 1551(a)(3), as amended, since
the same five or fewer individuals (A and B) own more than 80
percent of the stock of corporation X and Y as required under
section 1551(b)(2)(A) and the identical ownership equals more
than 50 percent as required under section 1551(b)(2)(B). 39
It is clear, therefore, that for purposes of determining whether a
controlled group exists under section 1551, a person has to own stock
in both members of the alleged controlled group. If Congress had not
intended this result it would not have used the word "such" individ-
uals in the underscored situation nor would it have stated in the
example that the "same" five or fewer must own eighty percent of
the stock of "X and Y," "as required" by the statute.
The 1969 Treasury proposals before the House illustrate that
the Treasury also contemplated common ownership by all members
of the controlled group. The definition of a brother-sister controlled
group as proposed by the Treasury was as follows:
[A] group of corporations would constitute a brother-sister con-
trolled group if (1) the same five or fewer persons own at least 80
percent of the voting stock or value of shares of each corporation,
and (2) these five or fewer individuals own more than 50 percent
of the voting power or value of shares of each corporation consid-
ering a particular person's stock only to the extent that it is
owned identically with respect to each corporation.4"
The examples which follow the definition, attempting to illustrate
it, provide only situations where all members whose stock is in-
cluded for purposes of the eighty percent test own stock in each
corporation.4
39. Id. at A212-13 (emphasis added).
40. Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, at 5168 (1969).
41. Id. at 5169.
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The Treasury Regulations, however, took the position that a
person did not have to own stock in each corporation in order to be
counted in the eighty percent test.2 These regulations were criti-
cized in many sectors as being inconsistent with the legislative his-
tory and the statutory language, outside the intent of Congress, and
leading to illogical results. 3 The issue of whether the ownership
Thus, for example, part (1) ...is met whether one person owns 80 percent
of the voting stock of each corporation, four persons each own 20 percent of the
voting stock of each corporation, or one person owns 60 percent of the voting stock
of one corporation and 40 percent of another, and another person owns 40 percent
of the voting stock of the first and 60 percent of the second.
42. The regulation construes section 1563(a)(2) by adding the words "singly or in combi-
nation" as follows: "(3) Brother-sister controlled group. (i) The term 'brother-sister controlled
group' means two or more corporations if the same five or fewer persons who are individuals,
estates, or trusts own singly or in combination, stock possessing. . . ." Treas. Reg. 8 1.163-
1(a)(3) (1973). The regulation offers the following example:
Example (1). The outstanding stock of corporations P, Q, R, S, and T, which have
only one class of stock outstanding, is owned by the following unrelated individu-
als:
Indi- CORPORATIONS Identical
viduals P Q R S T Ownership





TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 60%
Corporations P, Q, R, S, and T are members of brother-sister controlled group.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3)(ii), Example (1).
The disposition of the instant case is contingent upon whether or not Joseph Ofano's
stock can be considered for purposes of the 80% test although he failed to own stock in each
of the corporations.
Fairfax of Identical
Fairfax, Inc. No. Va. Ownership
William Herbert 100% 55% 55%
Joseph Ofano 0% 45% 0%
TOTAL 100% 100% 55%
43. See Bonovitz, Brother-Sister Controlled Groups Under Section 1563: The 80 Percent
Ownership Test, 28 TAX LAwYER 511 (1974-75); Kringel, Multiple corporation Proposed Regu-
lations raise more questions than they answer, 36 J. TAX. 358 (1972); Libin & Abramowitz,
supra note 28; Thomas, Brother-Sister Multiple Corporations-The Tax Reform Act of 1969
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requirements under section 1563 and the regulations were met was
never litigated before Fairfax." Nor was the meeting of the same
definitional requirements ever litigated under section 1551. Prior to
Fairfax the key issue in the area of multiple corporations and the
use of surtax exemptions always had been whether the motivation
for multiple incorporation was tax avoidance or business oriented.
As suggested previously, the tax consequences of falling into the
section 1563(a)(2) definition of a brother-sister controlled group are
much broader than the disallowance of surtax exemptions-which
was the concern of the instant case. First, section 1563(a)(2) groups
must share one $150,000 amount for purposes of computing the
accumulated earnings credits under section 535(c)(2) and (3).45 Sec-
ond, section 1563(a)(2) groups must share one $25,000 amount for
purposes of computing the limitations on the small business deduc-
tion of life insurance companies under sections 803(a)(3) and
803(d)(10).' Third, all component members of section 1563(a)(2)
groups are treated as one taxpayer for purposes of the dollar limita-
tions to the section 179 additional first year depreciation allowance
for small businesses." Fourth, section 1563(a)(2) groups must share
one $30,000 tax preference income exclusion under section 56.11
Fifth, the $25,000 investment credit permitted by section 46 must
be apportioned by 1563(a)(2) groups.49 Sixth, the $100,000 amount
of used section 38 property eligible for the investment credit permit-
ted by section 48 must be apportioned by controlled groups.'" Sev-
enth, under ERISA5' all employees of all corporations which are
Reformed by Regulation, 28 TAx L. REV. 65 (1972-73); 27 TAx LAw. 813 (1973-74). But see
White, The Tax Reform Act of 1969; Demise of Multiple Surtax Exemptions-When Too
Much of a Good Thing Proved Its Own Undoing, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1363, 1368 (1970).
44. In the interim between the tax court decision and its reversal by the court of appeals
the tax court was followed in T.L. Hunt, Inc., Txx CT. MEM. DEc. (P-H).The present decision has subsequently been followed in the eighth circuit. See T.L.
Hunt, Inc. of Texas v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977). A subsequent Tax Court
case has refused to follow the appellate courts' decision, however. See Baloian Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 68 T.C. 620 (1977). The court boldly stated: "Notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit's
disagreement with our position on this question, we remain convinced of its correctness." Id.
at 631.
45. I.R.C. § 1561(a)(2).
46. I.R.C. § 1561(a)(3).
47. I.R.C. § 179(d)(6)(A). Note, however, that for purposes of section 179(d)(7) the 80%
test of section 1563(a)(2) is disregarded.
48. I.R.C. § 58(b). For tax years beginning after December 31, 1975, the $30,000 amount
is changed to $10,000.
49. I.R.C. § 46(a)(6).
50. I.R.C. § 48(c)(2)(c). Note, however, that I.R.C. § 48(c)(3)(c) and Treasury Regula-
tion § 1.48-3(d)(4), like section 179(d)(7), eliminates the 80% test for purposes of defining a
brother-sister controlled group.
51. Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, § 1015, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 925.
[Vol. 32:461
TAX NOTES
members of a controlled group are treated as employed by a single
employer for purposes of determining qualifications requirements,
minimum participation standards, minimum vesting standards,
and the limitations on benefits and contribuii1n-provisions. Also, if
a plan is adopted by more than one member of a controlled group,
the minimum funding standard and limits on deductions are deter-
mined as if all employers adopting the plan were a single employer. 2
Eighth, members of a controlled group of corporations are treated
as one corporation for purposes of section 447 which provides that
corporations engaged in farming are to compute taxable income on
an accrual method of accounting with the capitalization of certain
pre-productive expenses. A corporation meets the requirements of
this section if it has less than $1,000,000 in gross receipts for each
prior taxable year.53 Ninth, in determining the amount of invest-
ment credit allowable for certain movie and television films, the
section 1563(a)(2) definition is used in describing "related persons"
which need the Secretary's consent to elect to have the "applicable
percentage" under section 46(c)(2)54 determined by a "ninety per-
cent rule.""5
Despite the plethora of consequences stemming from the con-
struction given section 1563(a)(2) by the Treasury Regulations, the
Fairfax court considered only the consequences that related to the
instant case-the denial of extra surtax exemptions. The court"
based its decision upon two foundations. First, Treasury Regula-
tions are to be upheld unless they are unreasonable and clearly
inconsistent with the statute. Since the regulations here are sup-
ported by both the language of the statute and its legislative history
they must be upheld.57 Second, when Congress expressly applied the
section 1563(a)(2) definition to ERISA in 1974, the regulations, al-
ready in existence, impliedly were approved and given the full force
of the law.5"
The court reasoned that the language of the statute did not
require common ownership by the "five or fewer persons" for pur-
52. I.R.C. § 414(b).
53. I.R.C. § 447(c).
54. This refers to the definition of "qualified investment" for purposes of certain credit
allowances under section 46.
55. I.R.C. § 48(k)(3)(D)(i). For another instance where section 1563(a)(2) controlled
groups are mentioned, see I.R.C. § 382(a)(5)(E).
56. The Court of Appeals wrote a one page per curiam opinion adopting the opinion of
the dissenting judges in the tax court. For purposes of clarity the dissenting judges' opinion
will be referred to as the opinion of "the court."
57. 65 T.C. at 807. See Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-50 (1969); United States v.
Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967); Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496,
501 (1948); Colgate Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 422, 426 (1943); Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S.
327, 336 (1931).
58. 65 T.C. at 808.
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poses of the eighty percent test because the fifty percent test and
the eighty percent test are separately stated. The identical owner-
ship test, which requires common ownership, is stated only in con-
junction with the fifty percent test. Therefore an individual must
have common ownership only for purposes of the fifty percent test.59
The court cited the following proposal from the Treasury Depart-
ment in support of its position:
Brother-sister groups.-A group of corporations in which five or
fewer persons own, to a large extent in identical proportions, at
least 80-percent of the stock of each of the corporations. This
provision expands present law by considering the combined stock
ownership of five individuals, rather than one individual, in
applying the 80 percent test. Even the mild 6-percent penalty
under existing law for brother-sister corporations claiming multi-
ple surtax exemptions is largely ineffectual because of the present
requirement that one person own 80-percent of the stock of each
corporation before the group of corporations is subject to the
penalty.
However, in order to insure that this expanded definition of
brother-sister controlled group applies only to those cases where
the five or fewer individuals hold their 80-percent in a way which
allows them to operate the corporations as one economic entity,
the proposal would add an additional rule that the ownership of
the five or fewer individuals must constitute more than 50-
percent of the stock of each corporation considering, in this test
of ownership, stock of a particular person only to the extent that
it is owned identically with respect to each corporation.0
From this the court also concluded that:
[T]he underscored words in the first sentence . . . merely indi-
cate that there will be common ownership "to a large extent"
among those persons whose ownership is considered for purposes
of the 80-percent test. That statement recognizes that there need
not be common ownership among all those persons taken into
consideration for purposes of the 80-percent test, and the com-
mon ownership that is required is specified by the 50-percent
test.'
59. 65 T.C. at 808-09. The tax court majority impeaches the dissent's statutory construc-
tion by arguing that since "five or fewer persons" is the conjunctive subject of both the 80%
test and the 50% test, both tests must be satisfied by the same group. Since the members of
the 50% group must own stock in each corporation, so must the 80% group members. The
tax court majority further argues that the words "each such person" appearing in the 50%
test referring to the people in the 80% test mean that all of the people in the 80% test 'must
also be in the 50% test (they must own some stock in each corporation). 65 T.C. at 803.
60. 65 T.C. at 809-10 (emphasis in original). See Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Seas., pt. 14, at 5394 (1969).
61. 65 T.C. at 810.
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The court found further support for its position in that at the
time of the expansion of section 1563(a)(2), the regulations under
section 1551 included an example where someone who owned stock
only in the transferor corporation and not the transferee corporation
had his stock ownership taken account of for purposes of the eighty
percent test."2 The court reasoned that since the legislative history
explicitly states that the section 1551 definition was to be applied
to section 1563(a)(2), "it is reasonable to assume that the draftsmen
of section 1563 were aware of such regulations and therefore in-
tended for the definition to include the situation described in it."63
The legislative history of section 1563(a)(2) is hardly as unequi-
vocal as the court would have us believe. From an examination of
the Tax Reform Hearings, it would appear that the Treasury De-
partment itself contemplated in both 1964 and 1969 that a person
must own at least some stock in each corporation in order to have
his ownership considered for purposes of the eighty percent test.6
It is also arguable, even from the legislative history cited by the
court,"5 that the eighty percent test must be one of common owner-
ship. It is clear that the 1964 test of one person having to own eighty
percent of the stock of each corporation was a test of common owner-
ship.6 When Congress expanded the eighty percent test to "5 or
fewer persons" the intent was to increase the size of the group exer-
cising the common ownership in order to prevent easy avoidance,
but not obliterate the requirement of common ownership."
In the regulations' example," none of the persons making up
the ownership group have any common control or ownership except
for A. Reading the eighty percent test in such a manner insures not
that the same interests own each corporation but merely that each
corporation will be a close corporation. Since the purpose of the
section 11(d) surtax exemption is to benefit close corporations 9 such
a result is untenable. ° Furthermore, the two tests read together
make most sense as a requirement that those persons exercising the
common control are the same persons as those exercising common
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.1551-1(g)(4), example (4) (1967).
63. 65 T.C. at 810.
64. See notes 31, 41 & accompanying text supra.
65. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
66. If only a test of control 51% would have been sufficient and 80% unnecessary.
67. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
68. See note 42 supra.
69. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
70. In the example, B, C, D, and E each have an interest in only one out of the five
corporations which they are supposed to control as a group. The touchstone is not that a small
group of people control the corporations together, but that a small group of people control
the corporation.
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ownership. Only in this way is it probable that the group will oper-
ate as a single economic entity.
Another problem with this interpretation is that it would lead
to situations where persons who own stock in only one corporation
will be surprised to find out that their corporations are part of a
controlled group and that their single holdings are contributing to
that result. The possibility that upset the tax court majority was as
follows:
Individual A owns 55 percent of corporation X and individual B
owns 45 percent thereof. If A were independently to enter into a
second business in corporate form the corporations would be com-
ponent members of a controlled group. We cannot believe that
Congress intended to surprise B with such a result.7
A similarly unfavorable situation would occur if A already
owned one business and then formed a second unrelated business
with B. If A owned fifty-five percent of the stock of the second
business and B owned forty-five percent of the stock, a brother-
sister controlled group would be formed. The law therefore would
dictate the absurd proposition that before B goes into business with
A he must investigate all of A's other holdings to make sure that A
and B together are not running two or more businesses as a single
economic entity."
The court's argument that the regulations to section 1551 sup-
port the proposition that there is no need for each individual to own
some stock in each corporation of the controlled group for purposes
of the eighty percent test is also subject to attack. Although one of
the examples presented by the regulations to section 1551 on a peri-
pheral point suggests such a conclusion, the rest of the examples
71. 65 T.C. at 805 n.5. The court was unperturbed by this result, rationalizing as follows:
If B owned as much as one share of corporation X the definition clearly would apply as it
would if A owned 80% of Y and B owned only 20%, although B may be equally surprised. 65
T.C. at 812. These situations, however, are distinguishable from the situation offered by the
majority at the tax court level. Even if B were to own only one percent of Y's shares, the fact
that B owns at least some stock in each corporation would greatly minimize the chance of B
being surprised to find out that the corporations are members of a controlled group or that A
has interests in both. In the second situation, although B, owning only 20% in one of the two
corporations, may still be surprised to find the two corporations belonging to a controlled
group, at least B's stock ownership will not be used to determine such a result.
72. Arguments as to why the statute demands that persons must own stock in each
corporation in order to have that ownership considered for purposes of the 80% test are
presented by the tax court majority. 65 T.C. at 803-06. See also Bonovitz, supra note 43, at
516-19, 530; Libin & Abramowitz, supra note 28, at 329; Thomas, supra note 43, at 79-84; 27
TAx LAW. 813 (1973-74).
73. See note 62 supra.
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under that section seem to support the opposite conclusion." Fur-
thermore, there is no such strong language (i.e. "singly or in combi-
nation""5 ), in the regulations to section 1551 as there is in section
1563 so as to suggest that a person does not have to own stock in
each corporation in order to be considered for the eighty percent
test.
Much more persuasive than the argument that the regulations
of section 1551 support the proposition that a person must own some
stock in each corporation to be considered for purposes of the eighty
percent test is that the statute itself and the legislative history
support such a proposition.76 To the extent that the regulations
under section 1551 hold to the contrary they are invalid.
The second prong of the court's attack was that by adopting the
section 1563(a)(2) brother-sister controlled group definition for pur-
poses of ERISA after the regulations in question came out Congress
impliedly accepted them as law. This analysis also is questionable.
The rule stated in the cases that the court cites in order to support
its proposition is that "Treasury regulations and interpretations,
long continued without substantial change, applying to unamended
or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received
Congressional approval and have the effect of law.""
The "reenactment doctrine" espoused by these cases should not
be stated as a per se rule, as the court intimates. Although this rule
has often been cited by the Supreme Court there have also been
instances where the Supreme Court has failed to follow it."5 Where
the reenactment doctrine has been espoused the court usually finds
the regulation to be at least reasonable in terms of statutory con-
74. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1551-1 (1967) and examples thereunder. Of the eight examples
cited throughout only one does not require all of the members of the controlled group to own
stock in both the transferee and transferor corporations. It is to be further noted that in the
exceptional example, all of those making up the 80% group for the transferee do hold stock
in the transferor, whereas one member of the transferors' 80% group fails to hold stock in the
transferee.
75. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.1551-1(e)(1)(ii) (1967) with Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3)
(1967). For commentary arguing that the regulations of section 1551 require common owner-
ship, see Bonovitz, supra note 43, at 522-28; Thomas, supra note 43, at 76-84; 27 TAX LAw.
813, 815 (1973-74); 2 TAX ADvisoR 326, 329 (1971). Contra White, The new broader sweep of
Section 1551: an analysis of IRS' Regulations, 28 J. TAX. 100, 102-04 (1968).
7Q. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
77. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967); Commissioner v. Flowers,
326 U.S. 465, 469 (1946); Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 291-92 (1945); Helvering v.
Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938).
78. See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973); Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co.,
285 U.S. 1 (1931). For a general discussion of the underlying issues in the area, see
Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 HARV. L. REv. 378 (1941); A Summary
of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REv. 398 (1941).
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struction, policy, and legislative history." In many of the cases cited
by the Court the reasonableness of the regulation was not really at
issue as in the instant case. 9 Where the regulation appears totally
unreasonable to the Court it has been held invalid in spite of being
long-continued.8 '
The argument for the reenactment doctrine here is weakened
by the fact that the regulation in question was not "long-continued"
when the section 1563(a)(2) definition was applied to ERISA.82 Also,
there is no evidence from the legislative history of the relevant sec-
tion of ERISA that the regulation in question had been considered
at all by Congress in its application of section 1563(a)(2) to section
414(1).8'
It is submitted that regardless of the Fairfax decision the stat-
ute forces this to be a problem area. The statute is defective not only
because it is worded poorly but because the mechanical application
that it calls for is not an appropriate response to the problem of
multiple corporations and surtax exemptions. The goal of section
11(d) is to aid small corporations by providing a surtax exemption."4
The broad goal of sections 1561 and 1563 is to deny more than one
surtax exemption to multiple corporations which are in fact a
"single economic entity." 5 The fact that the multicorporate ar-
rangement is motivated by "business purposes" rather than "tax
avoidance purposes" should be no defense to a denial of extra surtax
exemptions if the multiple corporations are in fact a single large
business. Yet common control and/or ownership do not in and of
themselves dictate such a result.
If a third test were added to the statute demanding some
"integration of activities""8 between the corporations, both equity
79. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 300-07 (1967).
80. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946); Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287
(1945); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938).
81. See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973).
82. The 1972 regulations were permanent for only two years when ERISA was passed.
Section 1563(a)(2) had not been reenacted. For a case from the Fifth Circuit where a regula-
tion was not accorded great weight because it was not long-continued, see Kurzner v. United
States, 413 F.2d 97, 112 (5th Cir. 1969).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1974); S. REP. No. 383, 93rd Cong.,
1st Sess. 43-44 (1973). This should be compared with United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299,
306-07 n.20 (1967) where the regulation in question was mentioned and approved by the
House and Senate.
84. See note 12 supra.
85. See note 23 supra.
86. The idea of an "integration" test in this area was developed in Surrey, Income Tax
Problems of Corporations and Shareholders: American Law Institute Tax Project-American
Bar Association Committee Study on Legislative Revision, 14 TAx L. REv. 1, 37-43 (1958-59).
Surrey's proposal was espoused in Multiple Corporations Under the Revenue Act of 1964, 18
VAND. L. REV. 1338, 1360-62 (1964-65). It was criticized in Multiple Incorporation to Obtain
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and effectiveness would be increased. Consider the following exam-
ples in support of this proposition. In the instant case, FAP and
NOVA would meet the integration test since they do the same type
of business in the same area and are run by the same people. 7 If they
meet the control and ownership requirements they should be forced
to share a single surtax exemption.
Contrast the instant case with the example that the tax court
majority was troubled with."8 X owns fifty-five percent and Y owns
forty-five percent of the stock of an incorporated auto shop. If X
went out and bought a restaurant by himself, and chose to incorpo-
rate, the two corporations would be forced to share a single surtax
exemption under the Fairfax rule. If the suggested test applied each
corporation would get a full surtax exemption. Although the fifty
percent test is met and so is the eighty percent test under one view,
there is no integration of business activities.
One final example will illustrate this. Three doctors incorporate
their medical practice, each taking one-third of the stock. If they
decide to invest in a real estate venture and incorporate their activi-
ties, each doctor taking the same one-third in that venture, the two
corporations would become a controlled group and would be forced
to share a single surtax exemption under sections 1561 and 1563
irrespective of the outcome in Fairfax. No doubt it is within the
purpose of section 11(d) to encourage the enterprising doctors to go
into a small business with their excess capital. The fact that the
medical practice and the investment venture are totally uninte-
grated should save the two corporations from being taxed as though
it were one large business.S
It is undesirable for the law in the field to remain as Fairfax
leaves it. The regulations' interpretation of section 1563, as ap-
proved in Fairfax, is probably much broader than what Congress
intended. It leads to results that Congress could not reasonably have
envisioned. The statute quite simply could be altered by Congress
so as to leave no doubt.'" It is further submitted that in addition to
Additional Accumulated Earnings Credits and Surtax Exemptions, 44 MINN. L. REv. 485,
510-11 (1959-60).
Section 1561 is criticized as providing only an arbitrary test in Reform of Multiple Surtax
Exemptions, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 145, 154-56.
87. 65 T.C. at 799-801.
88. 65 T.C. at 805 n.5.
89. The bottom line is that whenever one person owns two or more businesses that are
incorporated, that person will be automatically penalized no matter how totally unrelated
those businesses are. Whenever one person owns controlling stock in more than one corpora-
tion, the same result will occur as long as the rest of the stock of the corporations is owned
by a small number of persons.
90. If Congress intended the stock ownership of a person to be considered for purposes
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clarifying the eighty percent test Congress should consider a retreat
from a purely mechanical approach so as to effectuate the policies
behind the surtax exemption under section 11(d) and its disallow-
ance to multiple corporations under section 1561, without such a
preponderance of unwarranted spillover effects.
JAY NATHANSON
Funding of Marital Deduction Trusts Through
Equalization Clauses: Confusing Concepts of
Terminable Value and Terminable Interest
In a recent decision, the Tax Court concluded that an inter-
est passing to a surviving spouse under a trust instrument quali-
fied for a marital deduction where the interest was vested inde-
feasibly on the date of death but might have no value. The author
suggests that the Internal Revenue Service attack upon this es-
tate plan was based upon mistakenly equating terminable inter-
est with terminable value-a confusion which has existed at least
since the issuance of Revenue Procedure 64-19 in 1964.
In 1967 settlor-decedent ("Settlor"), Charles W. Smith, trans-
ferred the bulk of his assets to a revocable inter vivos trust.' Article
IV of the trust instrument directed itself to trust distributions. It
provided in pertinent part that the corpus was to be divided into two
separate portions if the Settlor's wife survived him. The spouse was
given a general power of appointment over the first portion, which
was intended to qualify for the marital deduction. The remainder
passed to a residuary, non-marital trust. The funding of each was
determined by an equalization clause.2 The Trustee filed the estate
of the eighty percent (80%) test regardless of some stock ownership in each corporation, they
could have added the four words added by the regulations, i.e., "singly or in combination."
See note 42 supra. If Congress intended it to be necessary to own some stock in each corpora-
tion, they could have adopted the language proposed by the 1969 Treasury Proposals by
adding the two words "same" and "these." See note 40 & accompanying text supra.
1. On June 7, 1920, the date of death, decedent's estate was valued at $3,492,764.32. Of
this amount $3,288,519.99 was held in the trust.
2. The clause in pertinent part read as follows:
(b) There shall then be allocated to the Marital Portion that percentage interest
in the balance of the assets constituting the trust estate which shall when taken
together with all other interests and property that qualify for the marital deduc-
tion and that pass or shall have passed to Settlor's said wife under other provi-
sions of this trust or otherwise, obtain for Settlor's estate a marital deduction
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